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1 Introduction
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models have become a work-
horse for policy makers and central bankers for comparing possible impact of
di¤erent policy scenarios. The proponents of these models claim that DSGE
models are capable of replicating a number of stylized business cycle facts, for
di¤erent developed and emerging economies, and are also not subject to the
Lucas Critique [Pichler, (2007)]. In the last two decades signicant progress has
been made regarding specication and estimation of these models according
to the need and features of the economy at hand. The most important recent
contributions in terms of specication and standardization of modeling proce-
dures involved in DSGE modeling are due to Smets and Wouters (2003) and
Christiano, et al. (2005). As a result of this signicant improvement in DSGE
modeling literature many central banks of advanced countries have already
developed their DSGE models recognizing the usefulness of these models for
policy analysis and forecasting. Following the example of developed countries
many of the emerging economies are also now focusing on constructing DSGE
models for their countries encompassing relevant features of their respective
economies.
The original DSGE models are actually the extension of real business cycle
(RBC) models. Kydland and Prescott (1982) laid the foundation of DSGE
modeling in the spirit of RBC theory. Real Business Cycle theory, assuming
price exibility and rationality of optimizing agents facing some constraints,
investigates quarterly uctuations when economy is hit by a real shock (the
most common one being a technology shock). The earlier RBC models were
criticized because economic policies had no role to play in these models. Fur-
thermore these models failed to replicate some of the empirical regularities
such as liquidity e¤ects, co-movement of productivity and employment or the
co-movement of real wages and output (Kremer et al., 2006). However, over
time, there has been extensive work done that has helped in making these
models theoretically parsimonious and empirically sound.
The New-Keynesian approach to DSGE models extended the RBC literature
by introducing rigidities in price and wage setting. Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1997) were the rst to introduce such a framework. The synthesis of
New-Keynesian and RBC models proved to be successful in terms of match-
ing economic theory to empirical evidence. For example, the idea of sticky
prices broke down the neutrality of money hypothesis, giving a new dimen-
sion and life to the usefulness of monetary policy. Despite all the progress,
these models failed to generate persistence of monetary policy shocks [Chari
et al., (1998)], which led to the emergence of a large literature [see for example
Andersen (1998), Huang and Liu (2002), and Edge (2002)] in order to develop
an alternative approach. With the passage of time a wider set of possible as-
1
sumptions were introduced into DSGE models. For example, nancial sector
rigidities (Christensen and Dib, 2008), asymmetric information (Collard and
Dellas, 2004), habit persistence in consumption (Fuhrer, 2000), adjustment
costs in investment and variable capital utilization (Smets and Wouters, 2003
and 2005), and customer hold-up e¤ects (Aksoy et al., 2009).
These models have been reasonably successful in replicating business cycles
features of developed economies and have gained considerable importance for
policy analysis and forecasting at central banks around the western world.
However, for developing countries like Pakistan the adoption of such models
requires a signicant amount of groundwork and customization i.e. to be con-
sistent with relevant micro evidence. However, any information about even the
basic micro foundations of Pakistan economy is di¢ cult to obtain as there is
an inherent lack of micro-based surveys and even appropriate frequency data
of major macroeconomic variables is mostly unavailable. Furthermore the lack
of forward looking variables available in developing countries further compli-
cates the situation. These challenges related to unavailability and consistency
of micro-macro data tend to be understated when it comes to developing
DSGE models for developing countries. For most of the existing literature on
DSGE models for emerging economies, key parameters are borrowed from the
literature and data transformation remains inadequate. One major contribu-
tion of this paper is that it overcomes some of these issues to a certain extent.
This has been done through conducting wage and price setting surveys of
manufacturing rms both in the formal and infomal sectors representing all
the subsectors under manucturing in Pakistan. Besides, we have tried to use
respresntative micro level datasets made available by Federal Bureau of Statis-
tics (e.g., Labor Force Survey) and compiled e¤ectively by us at the Research
Department.
In addition, certain features of an economy like Pakistan cannot be anchored
on the results of similar features from the developed world due to distinctly
di¤erent developing nature of emerging economies. So the blueprint of mod-
els borrowed from advanced economies would not work for these economies
without bringing them in line with relevant economic structure prevailing in
a given economy. Some of the common features of emerging economies which
di¤erentiate them from developed economies need to be embedded in the eco-
nomic models for meaningful policy implications include:
i) Existence of a large informal sector;
ii) Small open economies vulnerable to external shocks;
iii) Weak nancial sector;
iv) Weak economic and political institutions.
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Keeping in view the signicance of above issues, the objective of this project is
to develop a preliminary DSGE model of Pakistani economy consistent with
some of the key economic features of Pakistan. Since this is the very rst
attempt to do so we are prioritizing the inclusion of only one feature in the
otherwise standard DSGE model on the basis of our subjective degree of pref-
erence. As a result we incorporate informality in labor and product markets in
a simple DSGE model. Future versions of the model would incorporate other
relevant economic features of Pakistan.
2 Modeling with Informality: Literature on Developing Economies
Most of the literature on DSGE models has attempted to explain business
cycle uctuations of advanced economies with well established business cy-
cles features, but literature on business cycles of emerging economies is very
limited. However, in the past few years some e¤orts have been made in devel-
oping DSGE models capable of capturing the business cycle uctuations for
emerging economies. DSGE modeling for developing countries poses a number
of challenges where not only the economic environment is di¤erent but is also
less well-known. To exacerbate the situation further important features (even
the stylized facts) of such economies are also not well established.
Batini et al. (2011) has recently developed a DSGE model for Indian economy
with informality in goods market in the presence of credit constraints. They
also introduced labor market frictions in the formal sector a la Zenou (2008).
They used Bayesian technique for estimating parameters and have shown that
the inclusion of informal sector and nancial frictions improved the t of
their model. Peiris and Saxegaard (2007) introduced credit frictions in the
presence of informality with an assumption that part of the inputs used in the
production process are nanced through borrowing at a premium over deposits
from the informal sector. The study was aimed at evaluating monetary policy
trade-o¤s in low-income countries with informal lending sources. The model
was estimated using data for Mozambique.
Conesa et al. (2002) incorporated informal goods producing sector with dif-
ferentiated technology in a simple RBC model. In this model sector trade-o¤
is allowed through the presence of a wage premium in the formal sector. Fur-
thermore, labor is assumed to be indivisible in the formal sector. Households
can choose working between the two sectors with a given probability. A worker
in the informal sector can enjoy more leisure but at the cost of lower wage.
Some studies (e.g. Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) and Koreshkova (2006)) in-
troduced cash-in-advance constraint faced by the informal sector, where most
of the transactions are made through cash in order to analyze the role of
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money, in terms of an ination tax, on the informal sector. They tried to show
the e¤ect of the informal sector on optimal policy choice by government.
Aruoba (2010) and Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) also introduced cash-in-
advance constraint to di¤erentiate informal sector from the formal sector by
assuming that money is the only medium of exchange used in the informal
sector. In their paper, using a very specic search-based monetary model, they
found that large informal sector gets smaller in size and overall tax collection
becomes higher under rising ination.
Mattesini and Rossi (2010) analyzed the monetary policy in a dual economy
in the New Keynesian framework with one competitive (informal) and one
unionized (formal) sector. They came up with the conclusion that level of
output is associated with relative size of the two sectors.
Castillo and Montoro (2008) modeled their economy with frictions in the labor
market by introducing formal and informal labor contracts and analyzed the
interaction between the two sectors and monetary policy. They introduced
informality through hiring costs owing to labor market conditions (degree
of tightness). In their model rms in the wholesale sector are assumed to
balance the high productivity in formal sector with the lower hiring costs
faced by the informal sector. The main nding of this theoretical framework
is the cyclical behavior of informal sector i.e. it expands with rising aggregate
demand because of lower hiring costs. Through this channel a link between
informality, the ination dynamics and monetary policy is established. This
study supports the idea of informal labor market being a bu¤er for an economy.
Our model is closest to Conesa et al. (2002) in the sense that we introduce
an informal goods producing sector with di¤erentiated technology, as well as
informality in labor market in a simple RBC model. However, we di¤erentiate
formal and informal sectorslabor on the basis of skill from the same household
rather than assuming that households can choose between working for the
two sectors with a given probability. In this way we have segmented the labor
market with exibility that households can decide on working hours of labor
supplied to each of the two sectors, formal and informal, which maximizes
overall utility of the households. A wage premium is charged in the formal
sector over wage in the informal sector due to monopoly of households on
skilled labor.
The main reasons for developing a RBC model with informality in product
market and to some extent in the labor market is twofold. First to keep the
model simple with minimum number of parameters to be estimated or cali-
brated under a data scarce situation. Secondly, it is a fact that a signicant
part of Pakistans GDP (about 30 percent) is produced by the informal sector
(Arby et al., 2010). Similarly,70 percent of our labor force is engaged in the
4
informal sector as well (various Labor Force Surveys, FBS).
Furthermore, the frequency of our model is annual making a stronger case
for RBC type model. This is further supported by nding that annual price
rigidity does not hold for Pakistan. Choudhary et al. (2011) nd that all the
rms in their sample of Pakistani formal rms adjust prices within a year
irrespective of the competition they face. They also show that at least in the
manufacturing sector 58 percent rms are connected with the informal sector
either through demand or supply channels where demand channels tend to
dominate. This motivated us to model the production of goods and services
in the informal sector along with the formal sector.
3 Model
The model incorporates the informal sector through production as informal-
ity is one of the striking features of the developing countries. In our model,
economy consists of households, rms, government and a monetary authority.
There are two types of rms; formal and informal. These rms are further
classied as intermediate and nal good producing rms. Intermediate good
producing rms sell their products to the nal good producer, where the nal
good producing rms are only the retailers. Households derive utility from
leisure, real money balances and consumption. They also supply labor and
rent capital to rms. Each household has a unit of labor which is a composite
of formal (skilled) and informal (unskilled) labor. The formal (skilled) labor
is further divided into di¤erent types. Households have monopoly over each
type "r" of labor which gives them the market power in wage setting process
of such types of formal labor.
The nal goods are produced by using intermediate goods. Di¤erentiated
goods produced by the formal intermediate rms, employing hired labor and
capital, are sold to formal nal good producers in a monopolistically com-
petitive market. Labor is the only input used in the production of informal
intermediate goods, which are sold to informal nal good producers in a per-
fectly competitive market, which we assume for simplication.
In both formal and informal sector, nal goods are produced by packaging
intermediate goods under di¤erent technologies. Final output of both sectors
is sold in a perfectly competitive environment. Aggregate price index is com-
bination of sector prices. Government nances its consumption partly through
taxes on formal sector and partly through printing money. Monetary authority
follows Taylor type interest rate rule while setting its policy rate which then
is the rate at which formal rms and government borrows from the house-
hold. We have three exogenous shocks in our model i.e., technology shock;
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government spending shock/scal shock; and an interest rate shock.
3.1 The Household
The representative households utility function consists of consumption, ct,
real money balances,Mt
Pt
, and leisure 1  ht . The total time endowment to the
household is normalized to one. The preferences of the representative house-
hold can be described by the following life time expected utility function:
U(:) = Et
X
tUt(ct;
Mt
Pt
; 1  ht) (1)
where ht is total number of hours worked and   (0; 1) is the discount factor.
This particular utility function is also called the money in the utility function
(MIU). The main reason for adopting this particular functional form for utility
is the size of the informal sector in Pakistan which is essentially based on cash
transactions as in Arby et al. (2010). Therefore, preference for holding more
cash is a reasonable assumption for our economy.
U(:) = ln c(i) +  ln
M(i)
P
  h(i)
1+
1 + 
(2)
where  is the preference parameter on money holding. Here we would like
to make it a point to note that upper-case letters would denote nominal vari-
ables and lower-case letter denote real variables. The household faces following
budget constraint while making its decisions:
ct + it +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
=
Wt
Pt
ht +
Rkt
Pt
kt +
Mt 1
Pt
+ (1 +Rt 1)
Bt 1
Pt
+
Tt
Pt
+
t
Pt
(3)
The left hand side of (3) represents households total expenditures, while its
right hand side represents its total earnings where it , Bt, Wt, Rkt , kt, Rt, Tt ,
and  represent investment, bond holdings, nominal wage rate, rent on capital,
capital, interest rate on bonds, lump- sum transfers, and dividends/prot from
rms respectively. Capital gets accumulated according to:
kt+1 = (1  )kt + it (4)
where   (0; 1) is the capital depreciation rate. Household chooses ct, Mt, Bt,
ht, and kt, given (3) and (4), so that its life time expected utility is maximized.
First order conditions of the households utility maximization problem are
given as:
1
ct
= (1 +Rt)Et
1
t+1ct+1
(5)
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Et
"
t+1
(1 +Rt)
n
(1  ) + rkt+1
o#
= 1 (6)
ht =

wt
ct
 1

(7)
and

Mt=Pt
=
1
ct
  Et 1
t+1ct+1
(8)
where (5) is the typical Euler equation for consumption, (7) is the labor supply
equation and money demand is given by (8). (6) equates real rate of return
on bonds and capital.
3.1.1 Labor Supply Choice between Formal and Informal Sectors
Households aggregate labor is a composite of both formal, hFt , and informal
labour, hIt . It can be expressed as:
ht =

 #

hFt
1+#
+ (1  ) #

hIt
1+# 11+#
(9)
where fractions  and (1  ) represent formal and informal labor division of
the representative household respectively. Similarly the aggregate wage can be
expressed as:
Wt =



W Ft
 #
1+# + (1  )

W It
 #
1+#
 1+#
#
(10)
where  represents share of formal labor while # is inverse of elasticity of
substitution between formal and informal labor. The household optimizes her
wage earnings, by choosing formal and informal labor hours, given her optimal
set fct,Mt,Bt,ht,ktg. Households conditional demands for formal and informal
labor are:
hFt = 
 
wFt
wt
! 1
#
ht (11)
and
hIt = (1  )
 
wIt
wt
! 1
#
ht (12)
equations (11) and (12) show that supply of each type of labor changes with
relative wage of that type and aggregate labor supply change. Similarly formal
and informal wages can be written as:
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wFt = 
 
P Ft
Pt
!#
wt (13)
and
wIt = (1  )
 
P It
Pt
!#
wt (14)
Here we assume that formal labor hFt is a composite of labor di¤erentiated on
basis of di¤erent levels of skill represented by r. On basis of that, the aggregate
formal labor supply can take the following form:
hFt =
24 Z
0

hFt (r)
  1
 dr
35

 1
(15)
where  is elasticity of substitution between di¤erent labor types in the formal
sector. Aggregate wage in the formal sector can be written as:
W Ft =
24 Z
0

W Ft (r)
 1
dr
35
1
 1
(16)
Here we also assume that households have market power to set wages on basis
of its type of skill r, so it maximizes following function:
 
max
W Ft (r)
!
W Ft (r)h
F
t (r) W Ft hFt (r) (17)
Di¤erentiating the above (17) w.r.t W Ft (r) and simplifying we get
W Ft (r) =
0@ 1
1  1

1AW Ft (18)
where expression in parentheses on the right hand side represent mark up of
type r wage on average wage in the formal sector.
3.1.2 Choice between Formal and Informal Consumption
The representative household consumes goods produced in both formal and
informal sector. Households aggregate basket, which is a composite of both
formal and informal consumption, can be expressed as:
ct =
"
!
1


cFt
 1
 + (1  !) 1

cIt
 1

# 
 1
(19)
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where the FOC yields the following formal aggregate consumption:
cFt = !
 
P Ft
Pt
! 
ct (20)
and the informal aggregate consumption:
cIt = (1  !)
 
P It
Pt
! 
ct (21)
where ! and  are share of formal consumption in total consumption and elas-
ticity of substitution between formal and informal consumption respectively.
The general price level, based on the shares of formal and informal aggregate
consumption can be written as:
P 1 t = !

P Ft
1 
+ (1  !)

P It
1 
(22)
And, following the standard practice, we dene gross ination rate as:
t =
Pt
Pt 1
(23)
3.2 Firms Behavior
3.2.1 Retailers
3.2.1.1 Formal Retailers Retailers are the buyers of intermediate goods
which they just package and sell in perfectly competitive environment 1 . Fi-
nal good producers (retailers) in the formal sector produce good, yFt , using
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology with a continuum of
intermediate goods, yFt (m), as inputs:
yFt =
Z 1
0
yFt (m)
" 1
" dm
 "
" 1
(24)
where " is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated formal interme-
diate goods. Final goods formal producers prot function is given by:
1 The specication can be simpler following Gali (1994) where only one layer of
production can produce and sell di¤erentiated goods. However, both specications,
the one which we have used in our model, and the simpler one are equivalent. Our
specication would, however, be more insightful when price stickiness gets involved
in the formal manufacturing. At present there is no price stickiness due to its non-
existence under annual frequency.
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Ft = (1  )P Ft yFt  
Z 1
0
P Ft (m)y
F
t (m)dm (25)
where  is the at tax rate on nal goods. Retailers optimize their prot while
deciding on how much intermediate input m to purchase given its price and
elasticity of substitution. This prot maximization yield the derived demand
functions for each intermediate good m given by:
yFt (m) =
"
P Ft (m)
(1  )P Ft
# "
yFt (26)
Then the formal retailers aggregate price level is:
P Ft =
1
(1  )
Z 1
0
P Ft (m)
1 "dm
 1
1 "
(27)
3.2.1.2 Informal Retailers The informal retailers in our model are com-
pletely symmetric to the formal retailers with the exception that informal
retailers pay no taxes and can only use intermediate goods produced in the
informal sector. A nal good yIt is produced in the informal sector by using
informal intermediate goods as inputs with the following production technol-
ogy:
yIt =
Z 
yIt (j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
(28)
where  is elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated informal intermedi-
ate goods. The informal sector nal good producing rm maximizes its prot
as:  
max
yI(j)
!
P IyIt  
Z
pIt (j)y
I
t (j)dj (29)
First order condition yields the derived demand functions for each informal
intermediate good j which when aggregated is represented as following:
yIt (j) =
 
pIt (j)
P Ft
! 
yIt (30)
Hence, the aggregate price index P It of nal informal goods can be written as:
P It =
Z 
pI(I)
1 
dI
 1
1 
(31)
3.2.2 The Intermediate Goods Producers
3.2.2.1 Formal Firm The formal sector intermediate producers have to
decide about their demand for capital and labour for a given wage and capital
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rent in a monopolistic labor market (based on type of skill r) and a competitive
capital market. In addition, they set prices of their di¤erentiated products
while exploiting some degree of monopoly. This setup is supported by survey
ndings in Choudhary et al. (2011) where rms report that they remain in
the formal sector for sake of their monopolistic position.
Before moving towards pricing decision by formal intermediate rms, we fo-
cus on their demand functions for factors and marginal cost. Formal sector
intermediate producers employ the following technology for production:
yFt = atkt
hFt
1  (32)
where at is the exogenous level of technology embodied in the formal produc-
tion process. The resulting rst order conditions for wage and rent for capital
are given by:
W Ft
P Ft
= (1  ) at
 
kt
hFt
!
(33)
Rkt
P Ft
= at
 
kt
hFt
! 1
(34)
Combining (33) and (34) we can write the capital-labor ratio as:
rkt
wFt
=

1  
hFt
kt
(35)
where rkt and w
F
t are real rent on capital and real wage in the formal sector
respectively. This specication is reached by assuming the standard identical
rms assumption for aggregation. Using (33), (34) and (35) we can write
marginal cost as:
mcFt =
1
at
()  (1  ) (1 )

wFt
1  
rkt

(36)
The aggregate relative price of the formal intermediate goods production sec-
tor as compared to the aggregate price (which is a composite of formal and
informal aggregate prices) is expressed as (after exploiting the marginal cost
in 36):
P Ft
Pt
=

"
"  1

mcFt (37)
Using (37) and the fact that none of the price components is rm-specic, we
can write the aggregate price for the formal intermediaries as following:
P Ft =
1
(1  )

"
"  1

mcFt (38)
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which depends on the marginal cost mcFt and tax rate  :
3.2.2.2 Informal Firm The production function of the representative in-
termediate rm in the informal sector is given as:
yIt = h
I
t (39)
where informal labor is the only input and there is no capital and technology.
 only provides information on informal labor productivity. Since the inter-
mediate producers here are perfectly competitive, the prot maximization is
straight forward and implies:
P It
Pt
=
wIt

(40)
The aggregate price of the informal intermediaries is given as:
pIt = mc
I
t =
wIt

We have modeled the informal sector intermediate rm in a very simple way
in order to keep it easy to track. This modeling choice is further supported by
ndings in Choudhary et al. (2011).
3.3 Government Behavior
3.3.1 Monetary Policy
The central bank conducts monetary policy through a Taylor-rule type func-
tion. It manages the short-term nominal interest rate, Rt, in response to de-
viations of output yt and ination t from their respective potential/ target
levels. The interest rate reaction function is given by:
Rt = tr

t

 1  yt
y
 2where t is a nominal interest rate shock, r is the steady
state nominal interest rate, is targeted ination level and y is potential
output.
3.3.2 Fiscal Policy
Government nances its expenditures, consisting of its spending on goods and
services and making lump-sum transfers to households by imposing a at tax
on nal goods produced in the formal sector and also by printing money. It
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does so partially by selling bonds to the households on which it pays interest
back as well. Therefore, the governments budget constraint can be written as:
Gt + TRt +
(1 +Rt 1)Bt 1
Pt
= Y F +
Bt
Pt
+
Mt  Mt 1
Pt
(41)
where Gt = g * gt follows AR(1) process such as:
gt = &0 + &1gt 1 + "t (42)
3.4 Aggregate Resource Constraints
The economy wide resource constraints are based on formal output yFt and
informal output yIt ; where the formal sectors resource constraint is the tra-
ditional closed economy resource constraint. On the other hand the informal
sectors resource constraint equates informal output to informal consumption.
yFt = c
F
t + it + gt (43)
where gt is the real government spending.
yIt = c
I
t (44)
The overall economy-wide resource constraint, with informal sector incorpo-
rated, looks like:
yt = c
F
t + c
I
t + it + gt (45)
4 Calibration
All parameters in our model are calibrated for annual frequency. There are 22
parameters in total with 16 structural and 6 shocks related parameters (see ta-
bles 1 and 2). Structural parameters can be categorized into four broad groups:
(1) household related, (2) formal-informal consumption, (3) formal-informal
labour supply and (4) production function parameters. Most of the parameters
used in our model have been calibrated using partial estimation/computation
approach. However, only very few of the parameters, for which estimation re-
mained an issue throughout, are picked from existing DSGE models literature
preferably for developing countries.
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First of all, we discuss parameters related to households utility function. The
discount factor  is a benchmark of forward looking behavior has been com-
puted to be 0.99 by taking inverse of average long term real interest rate (see
Appendix A). This is in line with the estimated value of  in Ahmed, et al.
(forthcoming).  reects households preference for money holding and a value
of 0.25 for this parameter is taken from DiCecio and Nelson (2007). The co-
e¢ cient of labour supply in utility function  is xed at 1:5 following Fagan
and Messina (2009). This value is consistent with the posterior mean reported
by Smets and Wouters (2007).
The parameters P
F
P
, P
I
PF
, ! and  together govern the distribution of formal and
informal consumption. The steady state share of formal sector in overall price
level P
F
P
is set at 0.53 and share of formal consumption in total consumption
! is xed at 0.55. These values have been taken from Khan and Khan (2011).
P I
P
is 1  PF
P
and P
I
PF
is simply ratio of P
I
P
to P
F
P
. The value of ; elasticity of
substitution between formal and informal consumption has been calibrated to
ensure that steady state ratios match with those observed in data.
The parameters ; # and  characterize the interaction of formal and informal
sectors on the labour side. The share of formal labour supply in total labour
supply  = 0:29 is computed by taking average of ratios of number of people
employed in the formal sector to total number of people employed in the non-
agricultural sector during 1990-1991 to 2008-2009. The relevant labour force
data is collected from various issues of the Federal Bureau of Statistics La-
bor Force surveys. The elasticity of substitution between formal and informal
labour supply # is found to be 2 after estimation using before mentioned data.
Using cross sectional data of Labour Force Surveys conducted between 1997-98
and 2008-09, we estimate this elasticity for each survey period and then take
average of all estimated values to obtain nal value of 2 (see Appendix A). The
value of formal wage premium  is set at 0.25. This value has been taken from
the preliminary ndings of the formal sector wage setting surveys conducted
by the State Bank of Pakistan (see Choudhary et al. (Forthcoming)).
The two parameters  and  are related to production. To calibrate the share
of capital in production , we took a value of 0:50 which is quite close to
the average of capital shares of other less developed countries as reported by
Liu (2008). The depreciation rate  has been set at 0.15 which is in line with
values used by other authors in the literature on DSGE models for developing
countries such as  = 0:1255 as used by Garcia, et al. (2006). In addition, bal-
ance sheet analysis of joint stock companies listed at Karachi Stock exchange
reveals that overall depreciation rate has been close to 10 percent. Since less
well capitalized rms are expected to have higher depreciation rates, therefore
we have adjusted this estimate upwards for our nal value of 0.15.
The taylor rule responses of ination and output have been estimated by
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regressing nominal interest rate on deviations of ination and output from
their steady states. Following Ireland (2004),  t and  
Y
t are estimated to be
0.48 and 0.52 respectively (see Appendix A). Steady state gross ination 
has been estimated to be 1.09 (see Appendix A).
Table 1: Structural Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.99  0.29
 0.25 # 2
 1.5  0.25
PF
P
0.53  0.50
P I
P
0.47  0.15
P I
PF
0.89   0.48
! 0.55  y 0.52
 0.7  1.09
The parameters describing the three shock processes are estimated following
King and Rebelo (2000). Persistence of technology shock A and standard
deviation of technology shock A are set at 0.9 and 0.02 respectively. Similarly
G and G are xed at 0.78 and 0.14 respectively (see Appendix A). In the same
manner interest rate persistence, coming from the Taylor Rule, R is set at 0.28
and its standard error R is xed at 0.016. The data for these estimations of
shock related parameters has been acquired from Federal Bureau of Statistics
(FBS) and State Bank of Pakistan (SBP).
Table 2: Shock Process Parameters
Sr.# Parameter Description Value
1 A Persistence of technology shock 0.9
2 G Persistence of scal spending shock 0.78
3 R Persistence of interest rate shock 0.28
4 A SD of technology shock 0.02
5 G SD of scal spending shock 0.14
6 R SD of interest rate shock 0.016
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5 Results
5.1 Assessing the Simulation Performance of the DSGE Model
Before using DSGE model for policy analysis it is essential to test its capabil-
ity of replicating the business cycles stylized fact manifested by the Pakistani
data. It is common in the literature to compare moments of the data from
those generated by the model. Following the convention, we limit our moment
comparison exercise to output as an indicator of growth, aggregate consump-
tion and private investment. The data for these time series has been obtained
from national accounts compiled by FBS. We use the annual data from 1980-81
to 2009-10.
Tables 3a and 3b below present some preliminary results. We can see that
steady state results of the model are either very close or within the empirical
range of the data. The empirical range here are the minimum and the maxi-
mum values of the series over a decade during the data period from 1980-81 to
2009-10. As far as the relative volatility of consumption and investment with
output are concerned, our model overestimates these statistics as compared
to the data.
Table 3a: Steady State Ratios and Relative Volatility 2
Variables Steady State Ratio with Y Relative Volatility with Y
C 0:7
[0:68 0:84]
2:37
[1:24 1:56]
Pvt I 0:13
[0:10 0:16]
4:03
[3:73 3:85]
The cross-correlations of consumption and private investment with output
obtained from the model are also higher vis-a-vis data. The autocorrelations of
output and investment are lower while it is higher for consumption. However,
all of these moments are not too far from the range obtained for the relevant
moment from the data.
On the whole we can say that our model performs reasonably well on the basis
of these criteria and is in line with acceptable performance for DSGE models
in the literature.
We can see that most signicant deviations from the data moments of relative
volatility and cross correlation with output occur with respect to consump-
2 Numbers in parenthesis are minimum and maximum values over di¤erent decades
between 1980-81 to 2009-10.
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tion. This can be partly explained by the fact that there are doubts over the
accuracy of private consumption data for Pakistan.
Table 3b: Auto/Cross Correlations 3
Variables Y C Pvt.I
Y 0:56
[0:62 0:69]
   
C 0:97
[0:52 0:78]
0:47
[0:26 0:43]
 
Pvt.I 0:86
[0:56 0:70]
  0:34
[0:46 0:57]
In the national income accounting system of Pakistan, private consumption is
actually treated as a residual (also pointed out in Baqai, 1965). This point is
discussed in detail in Choudhary and Pasha (forthcoming) and Malik (forth-
coming).
5.2 Response of Economy to Structural Shocks
After the assessment of the simulation performance of the model, the next
step is to use the model for policy analysis i.e. to analyze the impulse response
functions generated in response to di¤erent exogenous structural shocks in our
model. In our simulation exercises, we include three shocks namely technology;
scal or government spending and interest rate shocks.
Figure 1, shows that following a positive technology shock in the formal sector
(where technology lies by design), investment, output and consumption in the
formal sector rise, while ination falls. Since output rises, wages and working
hours also rise and as a result there is an overall rise in households income.
On the other hand output in the informal sector falls instantly but tends to
rise in the subsequent periods. Similar is the behaviour of the labor hours of
the informal sector.
3 Numbers in parenthesis are minimum and maximum values over di¤erent decades
between 1980-81 to 2009-10.
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Figure 1: IRFs of the Technology Shock
The consumption of informal goods decline rst but then start increasing
soon. This alternating behavior of fall and rise in informal consumption is
due to the substitution and income e¤ects dominating each other in turns.
Since the technology shock results in lower ination meaning that the prices
of formal goods come down for the household (which now is earning more
as well) substitutes its informal consumption with the formal consumption
but as soon as the wages start coming down the substitution e¤ect dominates
resulting in improved demand for informal goods.
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Labor hours increase in the formal sector, however, the magnitude is small
i.e. due to the advancement in technology labor productivity increases which
then cancels out the demand for extra labor arising due to higher formal
consumption.
The informal sectors wage rate risies instantly after the shock resulting from
the spillover e¤ect of an initial increase in demand for labor in the formal sector
(it is due to the income e¤ect resulting from higher formal consumption due
to initial increase in demand of labor and rise in the wage rate). Later the
wage rate declines and follows that of the formal sector.
Since in our model, the link between formal and informal sectors is modeled
in a way that they interact mainly through consumption, and technology only
e¤ects the formal sector, the intensity of the impact of the technology shock
on informal consumption and informal wage is minor and is only in form of
spillover from the formal sector through income e¤ect rst and then through
a convergence oriented substitution e¤ect of consumption.
In response to a positive shock to government spending (see gure 2) the
nominal rate of return increases making it di¢ cult for the private formal rms
to invest in capital. This is the crowding-out e¤ect of government spending on
private investment and is experienced more intensely by the formal producers
who need to raise capital on their own. To this extent the informal sector
(i.e. informal production) is una¤ected by crowding-out as their production
process only utilizes labor and hence has no role for capital, however, spillovers
remain.
This crowding-out results in lower level of aggregate output which then lowers
aggregate wage with a certain lag of time. However, initially, hours worked and
wages rise in the formal sector. This rise in wages is only for a short duration
after which they fall below the steady state level.
In our model, since government both consumes and taxes the formal sector
goods, higher government spending would lead to increased formal output
production. This explains the initial positive jump in the formal output. This
sudden rise is short-lived after which formal output falls below the steady
state level due to the crowding-out e¤ect. Consequently, the informal sectors
output, consumption and labor hours fall below the steady state level.
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Figure 2: IRFs of the Fiscal Shock
Over time, the overall income of the household falls, consumption falls, and as
a result output falls below the steady state, making demand for labor lesser
than supply for labor. The inationary rise in government spending makes
formal goods more expensive.
The income e¤ect thus results in relatively lesser e¤ect on fall in consump-
tion of the informal goods as compared to the formal goods. This is because
households substitute some part of their expensive formal consumption with
the informal counterparts. This can be seen with the rising trend of the labor
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hours of the informal sector. However, the wage level of the informal sector is
also subject to spillovers from the formals sector.
The results of scal shock leading to crowding-out of private investment have
also been empirically veried for Pakistan (see Khan and Khan, 2007; and
Ahmad and Qayyum, 2008).
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Figure 3: IRFs of the Interest Rate Shock
Figure 3 shows that, in response to a positive monetary policy shock, out-
put, investment, labor hours, and wages decline on aggregate level which is
a standard result of DSGE models. The ination also decreases signicantly
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but only for a short period. This immediate and strong response of ination
is due to exible prices, a feature of Pakistan economy in an annual setting.
Aggregate consumption also declines. This behavior is rational since house-
holds substitute consumption for investment in bonds issued by the govern-
ment, whereas private investment in the formal rms decline due to relatively
higher interest rate.
Consumption at sectoral level increases with an insignicant size and for
shorter period after which it starts decreasing and becomes negative. The
sudden positive jumps in the level of formal and informal consumption in re-
sponse to monetary policy shock are inconsistent with empirical evidence on
consumption which generally is in the form of aggregate consumption only. We
nd no suitable explanation for such behavior of these sector specic impulse
responses.
Our results are generally consistent with Batini, et al. (2011) for Indian econ-
omy, and especially for sector specic consumption. The policy impact on
informal sector are small in size and shorter in duration as the policy rate is
not directly linked with the production process in the informal sector. The
response by the informal sector variables is only due to spillover e¤ects from
formal sector, mainly coming from the households consumption decisions, as
explained earlier. Generally, on aggregate level, the direction of impulse re-
sponses from all three shocks is in line with existing literature (see Smets and
Wouters, 2003).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a general equilibrium model with an informal sector
and three types of shocks. The theoretical moments of the model perform
reasonably well for private investment and less so for consumption. The latter
is to be expected as private consumption and is treated as a residual in the
aggregate resource constraint equation of the national accounting system of
Pakistan. Further probing reveals that per capita consumption from aggregate
data and surveys on household consumption do not match. Consequently,
empirical claims on consumption have to be taken with a pinch of salt.
The direction and the propagation pattern of our impulse responses to shocks
are theoretically sound and match patterns present in the existing literature.
In particular, crowding-out e¤ects on private investment are strong while there
are relatively weak spillover e¤ects of shocks to the informal economy implying
that the informal economy can possibly serve as a shock absorber.
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Two important extensions on the basis of the present paper are being sought.
First is theoretical and entails micro-founding consumption and labor supply
decisions when it comes to choosing between the formal and informal sectors
as well as opening up the formal sector rms to foreign competition. Second
is empirical and relates to developing quarterly time series of relevant macro
variables so that general equilibrium models may be considered for short term
policy analysis.
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Appendix
A Parameter Estimation
Discount Rate ()
The discount rate has been estimated using annual data from 1981   2011.
Return on government bonds and change in CPI have been used to measure
long term interest rate and ination respectively. To incorporate expectations,
lagged ination has been used to calculate the real interest rate.
Elasticity of Substitution Between Formal and Informal Labour (#)
In order to estimate #, we used the micro-level data from the annual Labor
Force Surveys. We compiled labor force survey data from the last several waves
available between 1997-98 and 2008-09. The survey was not conducted in 2000-
01, 2002-03 and 2004-05.We estimated the elasticity of substitution between
formal and informal sector separately for each wave (as well as for all the data
compiled together) . We ran the following regression as in Psacharopoulos and
Hinchli¤e (1972):
ln
 
W Ft
W It
!
= a+ # ln
 
LFt
LIt
!
where W Ft & W
I
t are the hourly wage rates of formal and informal sector
employees in a household. LFt & L
I
t are the average hours worked in a week
by employees in the formal and informal sector respectively. A caveat for our
estimation of elasticity of substitution between formal and informal labor is
that we were limited by the nature of LFS being a household survey. Our
sample was reduced signicantly for estimation by the fact that we could only
use data from households that have more than one employee as well as at least
on each in the formal and informal sector.
We considered an employee to be part of the formal sector if his/her response
to the LFS question what kind of enterprise?about his/her work place was
any one of Federal Government, Provincial Government, Local body Govern-
ment, Public enterprise, Private limited company, Public limited company and
Cooperative society. In addition, the respondents who answered the enterprise
question with either Individual Ownership, Partnership or Other were consid-
ered part of the formal sector if and only if their enterprises kept written
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accounts (as asked in the next question of the survey Does the enterprise
keep written accounts?). On the other hand employees that responded to the
enterprise question with either Individual Ownership, Partnership or Other
and also answered the written accounts question with either Noor Dont
knowwere considered part of the informal sector.
Taylor Rule ( t and  
Y
t )
To obtain response of policy interest rate to deviations of ination and output
from steady state, we regress log of interest rate on deviations of ination and
output from their trend values. We use average call money rate, GDP deator
and per capita real GDP for interest rate , ination and output. Deviation of
ination from steady state is measured using residuals of following estimation:
ln t = c+ 

t
Results of this estimation show c =0.087331 implying steady state gross ina-
tion equal to 1.09. For deviation of output from steady state, we regress log
of per capita real GDP on constant and trend through following equation and
take residuals:
lnYt = c+ t+ 
Y
t
Furthermore, to estimate the response of interest rate to deviations in ination
and output, we estimate following equation:
lnRt = c+ 
t 1 + 
Y Yt 1
Estimated responses to ination and output deviations are then normalized
as 

+Y
and 
Y
+Y
to yield values of 0.48 for   and 0.52 for  y.
Shock Process (A,G,R; A,G; R)
The TFP series is obtained by using residuals of estimated neo- classical pro-
duction function thorough following regression:
lnYt =  lnKt + (1  ) lnLt + lnAt
To estimate A, we estimate the following equation:
lnAt = c+ A lnAt 1 + u
A
t
A is calculated using residuals of above equation. Owing to unavailability
of actual data, capital stock series has to be calculated using the perpetual
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inventory method. There are di¤erent ways to calculate capital stock series and
parameters of technology shock process are sensitive to variations in capital
stock series. Using di¤erent series, we get a range of estimates for A between
0.85-0.95 and A 0.0095-0.025. From these ranges, we choose the values of
0.9 and 0.02 for A and A respectively. Similarly, to obtain G and G, we
estimate the following equation:
ln gt = c+ G ln gt 1 + 
g
t
Using log of real per capita government consumption, estimation of the above
yield values of 0.78 for G. Standard deviation of residuals from above regres-
sion yields estimate of G that is 0.14. The parameters of the interest rate
shock, i.e., R and R have been estimated in the similar manner as well.
However, we have used the residuals of the Taylor Rule instead the simple
AR-1 formulation followed for the other two shocks. The values obtained for
R and R are 0.28 and 0.016 respoectively.
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B Complete Model
Financial assets optimization equation
1
ct
= (1 +Rt)Et
1
t+1ct+1
Physical assets optimization equation
Et
"
t+1
(1 +Rt)
n
(1  ) + rkt+1
o#
= 1
Aggregate hours worked optimization equation
ht =

wt
ct
 1

Money holding optimization equation

Mt=Pt
=
1
ct
  Et 1
t+1ct+1
Capital accumulation equation
kt+1 = (1  )kt + it
Supply of formal labour
hFt = 
 
wFt
wt
! 1
#
ht
Supply of informal labour
hIt = (1  )
 
wIt
wt
! 1
#
ht
Composite wage rate
wt =
"


wFt
 1+#
# + (1  )

wIt
 1+#
#
# #
1+#
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Informal wage rate
P It
Pt
=
wIt

Formal wage rate
wFt =

wIt

where,
 =
 

  1
!
Formal price level
P Ft
Pt
=
1
(1  )


"  1

mcFt
General price equation
P 1 t = !

P Ft
1 
+ (1  !)

P It
1 
Formal consumption
cFt = !
 
P Ft
Pt
! 
ct
Informal consumption
cIt = (1  !)
 
P It
Pt
! 
ct
Gross general ination rate
t =
Pt
Pt 1
Gross sectoral ination rates
Ft =
P Ft
P Ft 1
and It =
P It
P It 1
Formal production function
yFt = atkt
hFt
1 
Capital-labour ratio
kt
hFt
=

1  
wFt
rkt
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Marginal cost
mcFt =
1
at
()  (1  ) (1 )

wFt
1  
rkt

Informal production function
yIt = h
I
t
Taylor type rule
Rt = tr
 
t
t
! 1  yt
yt
! 2
Fiscal budget constraint
Gt + TRt +
(1 +Rt)Bt 1
Pt
= Y F +
Bt
Pt
+
Mt  Mt 1
Pt
Formal and informal sectorsaggregate resource constraints
yFt = c
F
t + it + gt
yIt = c
I
t
Economy wide aggregate resource constraint
yt = c
F
t + c
I
t + it + gt
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C Complete Model in Steady State
Financial assets optimization equation
R =


  1
Physical assets optimization equation

n
(1  ) + rk
o
= 1
Hours worked optimization equation
h =

w
c
 1

Money holding optimization equation

M=P
=
1
c
   1
c
Capital accumulation equation
i = k
Supply of formal labour
hF = 
 
wF
w
! 1
#
h
Supply of informal labour
hI = (1  )
 
wI
w
! 1
#
h
Composite wage rate
w =
"


wF
 1+#
# + (1  )

wI
 1+#
#
# #
1+#
Informal wage rate
wI = 
P I
P
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Formal wage rate
wF =

wI

General price equation
P 1  = !

P F
1 
+ (1  !)

P I
1 
Formal consumption
cF = !
 
P F
P
! 
c
Informal consumption
cI = (1  !)
 
P I
P
! 
c
Gross general ination rate
 = 1
Formal production function
yF = khF 1 
Capital-labour ratio
k
hF
=

1  
wF
rk
Marginal cost
mcF = ()  (1  ) (1 )

wF
1  
rk

Formal price
P F =
1
(1  )

"
"  1

MCF
Informal production function
yI = hI
Demand for informal labour equation

P I
P
= W I
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Taylor type rule
R = r



 1  y
y
! 2
Formal and Informal sectorsaggregate resource constraints
yF = cF + i+ g
yI = cI
Economy wide aggregate resource constraint
y = cF + cI + i+ g
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D Complete Model in the Log-linearized Form
Financial assets optimization equation
ect =  RfRt + gct+1 + gt+1
Physical assets optimization equation
Et gt+1   RfRt =  rkgrkt+1
Hours worked optimization equation
fht = 1

(fwt   ect)
Money holding optimization equation
 ect = (1  )   ~Mt + ~Pt  Et (~t+1 + ~ct+1)
Capital accumulation equation
ekt = (1  ) gkt 1 + eit
Supply of formal labour
fhFt == 1#
gwFt   fwt+fht
Supply of informal labour
fhIt = 1#
fwIt   fwt+fht
Composite wage rate
fwt = 1
w
1+#
#
 


wF
 1+#
# gwFt + (1  ) wI 1+## fwIt
!
Informal wage rate fwIt = fP It   fPt
Formal wage rate gwFt = (   1)fwIt
Formal price level
~P Ft   fPt =gmcFt
Informal price level fwIt = fP It   fPt
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General price equation
fPt = ! gP Ft + (1  !) fP It 
Formal consumption fcFt =   gP Ft   fPt+ ect
Informal consumption ecIt =   fP It   fPt+ ect
Gross general ination rate
ft = fPt   gPt 1
Formal production function
fyFt =  ekt + (1  ) fhFt + eat
Capital-labour ratio fkFt =gwFt + fhFt   frkt
Marginal cost gmcFt = frkt + (1  )gwFt   eat
Informal production function fyIt = fhIt
Taylor type rule
~Rct =  1ft +  2 eyt + etfyFt = 1yF
h
cFfcFt + ieit + egti
yt =
1
y
h
cFfcFt + cI ecIt + ieit + egti
Gross general ination rate
ft = fPt   gPt 1
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